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Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare.
Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border. They decide whose name gets
on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect
for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute. This article describes how judicial review
predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when
government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups. It then
proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy. While it is rare that
discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial review, courts’ role is often so
circumscribed or deferential that the probability of uncovering problems almost certainly falls close to
zero. The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards. Some
decisions no doubt benefit from the speed and accountability that results from limiting judicial intervention.
Yet judicial review’s evisceration probably makes it easier for some government officials to subtly
manipulate their discretion to promote appealing political impressions, for others to engage in outright
malfeasance, and for still other (more virtuous) officials to simply fail to learn from their mistakes –
whether these arise in deciding who to charge with a federal crime, who to designate as an enemy
combatant, or how much money to freeze in a suspicious charity’s account. The reliance on judicial review
to manage discretion makes it hard to address these concerns in part because courts routinely define much
of their work in terms of applying the same standard of deference to every case in a particular class,
making it difficult to increase the stringency of review in some policy domains without making the costs
allegedly prohibitive. As a conceptual alternative, I propose a framework for systematically auditing
samples of discretionary decisions and making those results public. Audits help sever the connection
between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion and the stringency of review, and avoid the
potentially distorted picture of bureaucratic activity created by a litigation-driven process. These
properties make audits a promising supplement to judicial review in those instances where it is plausible to
believe that more could be learned from incisively studying a subset of cases instead of superficially
reviewing more of them. Despite their potential value, such audits are almost never done by existing
federal audit bureaucracies (the congressional Government Accountability Office and the departmentspecific Inspector General Offices), nor does the legislature seem to do them itself in connection with
oversight hearings. I conclude by discussing some of the political and bureaucratic dynamics working
against these audits and suggesting how they may be weakened.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem is a familiar one. Government officials have staggering discretion
when deciding what industrial plants to inspect for safety violations, whom to indict, who
gets turned away by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at a port of entry
without being allowed to plead her case for asylum, what allegedly terrorist assets to
freeze, or whose name DHS puts on a government “no fly” list. Despite an oftenmentioned social commitment to judicial restraints on public power,1 our laws routinely
create and protect discretion instead of restraining it. Which means public officials
making certain crucial discretionary choices are, in turn, rarely restrained by courts –– or
by anything except their own conscience or occasional fits of political attention. All this
discretion presumably allows executive authorities to make decisions quickly and
efficiently, and the public to hold those authorities accountable. It spares executive
authorities the worry that courts will endlessly second-guess their decision when they
decide what target to bomb or what assets to freeze. Unfortunately, discretion also lets
authorities shirk instead of learning from their mistakes, and abuse their powers instead
of using them responsibly. Which raises the pressing question of how public
organizations with such considerable discretion will (be forced to) learn from their
1
See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(subjecting an informal,
discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to judicial review on the basis of statutory
language prohibiting federal aid for highways through public parks unless “no feasible and prudent
alternative” existed). Overton Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and
stringency) of judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions. But review remains either
unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving national security,
foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, public benefits, and investigation or
prosecution. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Regarding the trope that judicial
review should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see Rachel E. Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); David Cole, Judging the Next
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003);
James E. Pfander, article I Tribunals, article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118
HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
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mistakes, and how they will be policed against abusing their legal powers. Although
judicial review is often considered a central tool in preventing mistakes or abuses,2 the
benefits of discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and policy debate about the proper
stringency of such review.3
This article challenges the terms of that familiar debate in order to address the
underlying question of how discretion should be supervised in a complicated political
environment. It tells the story of how judicial review systematically fails to effectively
balance discretion’s costs and benefits, particularly when it comes to certain discretionary
choices like the ones in the first paragraph, where the executive branch has special
powers to significantly affect the fate of an individual, group or company.4 In the
process, I show how the paradigm of judicial review often ill-serves the valuable goals of
helping bureaucratic organizations learn from their failures and avoid political pressures
that endanger their missions. The problems arise both in national security and domestic
regulatory contexts, domains that have been traditionally treated separately but
increasingly blur.5 The article then shows how audits of targeted discretion can fill
certain gaps left by deferential judicial review, or indeed, by the absence of any judicial
review at all.
Part I begins by reviewing the extent of executive discretion, and the traditional
approach courts and legislators use to control it. What this brief examination highlights
is how no plausible justification for executive discretion can deny the existence of a
trade-off between the value of discretion and its potential cost. Bureaucratic
organizations need some flexibility to do their job. On the other hand, any meaningful
review process consumes resources, takes time, and reduces the freedom of choice that
makes executive discretion valuable in the first place. In response to this dilemma, courts
routinely apply differing degrees of stringency when reviewing executive decisions.
Their pervasive calculus of deference may take shape at legislators’ explicit behest (as
with the CIA Director’s power to decide which employees are national security risks) or
at the courts’ own hands. Consider, for example, the fate of individuals that executive
2

See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (summarizing previous
interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the Court’s conclusion that “Congress meant
to hold federal agencies accountable by making their actions subject to judicial review.”); Rebecca L.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998)(emphasizing the
alleged role of judicial review in promoting accountability).
3
Voices on one side emphatically insist on greater opportunities for highly-stringent judicial review of
executive branch actions. See, e.g., Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 216 (“The vast quantities of unnecessary
discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary power that
is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked”). Cole, supra note 1, at
2567. Similarly emphatic voices take the position in equipoise. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Ruth R. Wedgwood, Al Qaeda,
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328 (2002). Similar debates play out in the
context of constitutional torts. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action As Individual
Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395 (2003). At least some of the debate turns on differing
views about the extent to which a larger “political process” promotes “accountability.” I discuss this in
Parts III, and IV.
4
See Part I.a. infra.
5
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005)(“In war no
less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken
with close reference to standard principles of administrative law.”).
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authorities designate as enemy combatants. Courts can increase the stringency of review
by requiring more thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing the
deference accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the absence of hearings) to the
executive determinations themselves.6 Greater stringency of review presumably reduces
the probability that someone would be labeled an enemy combatant by mistake, or
because she is (for example) merely a political opponent of the president. But it allegedly
increases the resources that society must expend on the review process and that the
executive branch must expend defending its decision.7 If stricter review consumes
substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility of embarrassment for
executive officials, it may also chill the authorities from designating individuals that
should (in an ideal world) receive such a designation. The same problem arises in the
other contexts involving targeted discretion, such as freezing assets and making
prosecutorial decisions. In response, courts tend to vary the deference they give the
executive or her agent.
Yet this account neglects an alternative way of managing the costs and benefits of
discretion besides adjusting the stringency or availability of judicial review. The
alternative is for some court-supervised or independent authority to use audits to sample
discretionary decisions and to review them more thoroughly, rejecting the assumption
that a given degree of review stringency should be applied to all cases in a class. Despite
their relative absence from discussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits
of this kind are familiar from a panoply of private and public sector contexts – as with
insurance companies that review a small slice of their closed files to learn from their past
behavior, tax enforcers who audit a sample of the public at random (or nearly so), or
courts handling complicated class actions and picking out a sample of cases from the
class to learn more about the merits. Because they are an alternative to imposing a single
6

Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988)(finding CIA director’s power to fire employee on
national security grounds committed by law to agency discretion) with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center
v. Bureau of Land Mgt., 387 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2004)(finding, under an arbitrary and capricious standard
that the court understood to require “hard look” review, that the Bureau of Land Management’s
environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the cumulative impact of the sales). I don’t mean to
minimize the subtleties of the variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts
(and even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant. Separation of powers,
deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial deference to expert determinations of
government agencies, and statutory interpretation techniques all figure in this process. Even the two cases I
cite here represent extraordinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decision
are also different. The point here is how nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines require (or at
least allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and benefits associated with discretion, and
different ways of striking that balance are associated with distinct degrees of stringency in the court’s
review of some executive decision. As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when
applying these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the review of
discretionary executive decisions.
7
See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Heckler v. Chaney, 1984 WL
566059, 4 (November 23, 1984)(“[R]espondents’ submission, if accepted, would allow anyone to seek
judicial review of the agency’s decision not to bring enforcement proceedings under any portion of the
Act.”)(emphasis added); Brief for the Respondents, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020, 12 (March 29, 2004)(arguing that further factual development of the
circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant’s designation as such “would divert the military’s
attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan…”).
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standard across the board, audits have the potential to disrupt the familiar, repetitive
debate about whether our society deserves greater court protection of its rights and
prerogatives. Put differently, even if one accepts the executive branch’s strident (and
frequently questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if discretion were more easily
reviewed in court, there remains a viable option for reviewing that discretion without
incurring the various costs associated with traditional judicial review.
This wouldn’t matter much if the conceptual choice between deferential review
and audits were a mere quirk of form. Not so. Under quite reasonable assumptions,
deferential judicial review could be worse than review using audits even though the costs
may be similar. The absence of audits, conversely, diminishes our system’s capacity to
detect executive branch manipulation.8 It may also dampen the incentives of executive
branch bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and makes it easy for key actors in the
system to avoid articulating (either in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are
actually supposed to govern executive discretion. Together these dynamics ultimately
affect the costs and benefits of laws that grant the executive branch discretion in the first
place, and also the political context governing those grants of legal power. In principle,
we should expect an accountability-power trade-off: some people and groups should be
willing to see the executive branch get more power but only if it could be reliably
supervised. While the devil may be in the details, Part II surveys some of these problems
and discusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Little of this thinking has influenced the review of the executive branch’s
discretionary decisions. Instead, executive discretion is supposed to be policed through
two standard mechanisms quite unlike the audits I described above. At one end of the
spectrum lie courts that seem to conceive of the task at hand in terms of articulating or
(on the basis of legislative enactments) applying different standards of deference to
review all discrete decisions of a particular kind (i.e., all enemy combatant designations,
all personnel decisions in intelligence agencies, all decisions by OSHA to initiate
investigations, and so on). At the other end lie mechanisms that combine some kind of
external inspection of agency practices with political safeguards: Inspector General’s
Offices, the Government Accountability Office, congressional oversight, and similar
procedures that produce reports on financial management, discussions of organizational
problems, hearings, and testimony. While the court-centered end of the spectrum suffers
from the aforementioned limitations, one might imagine that review provided by audit
bureaucracies and the legislatures could fill the breach. As Part III shows, it’s not that
simple. Rarely if ever do these mechanisms focus on substantively evaluating a discrete
sample of targeted executive decisions rather than the finances or performance of entire
programs, and some kinds of decisions (like prosecutorial charging decisions) seem a
8

Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically solve organizational learning
and accountability problems involving the law. As I note in Part II, a great deal depends on details of
institutional design. The impact of an audit system also depends on the public’s response, and the
institutional dynamics affecting that response. Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely
provide a false sense of security – which is in some sense precisely my criticism of judicial review in many
of the contexts I discuss in this paper. Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more likely to provide
precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the potential advantages that a carefullystructured audit system could generate. For a thoughtful discussion of role of audits and the pitfalls in
designing them, see MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
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trifle too mundane to attract much attention from our existing auditing bureaucracies. In
fact, using new data complied from samples of reports from the GAO and Inspectors
General, I show how these audit bureaucracies do nearly anything except the audits of
executive discretion I advocate here.
Why, then, have audits of targeted discretion remained largely irrelevant in
reviewing executive discretion? In Part IV I discuss four reasons, which together help
make a more general point about the likely disconnection between what we expect of our
public law and what public bureaucracies actually deliver. The first is a frequent failure
to distinguish between different types of executive discretion that may call for distinct
kinds of review. “Targeted” discretionary decisions (applying an implicit or explicit
legal standard) are most obviously suited for audit review. Broad policy judgments that
lie at the core of regulatory rulemaking, on the other hand, may be harder to review in
this fashion. Second, key players may lack an organizational or policy interest in audits
because they have an investment in perpetuating some aspect of the current system. The
deference approach may yield greater discretion on balance to the executive because it
makes reviewing authorities deferential across the board. On the other side, advocates of
restricting discretion may also go for broke through legal and legislative strategies that
apply across the board, and may galvanize supporters with troubling scenarios. Third, the
current system is boosted by some inertia borne from adversarial adjudication, where
lawyers tend to conceive of their role as zealous advocates on behalf of individual clients
and reviewing institutions (especially courts) are conceived as direct protections of the
rights of similarly-situated individuals. Finally, the existing audit bureaucracies fail to
use their legal authority to do audits of targeted executive discretion in part because of a
persistent preoccupation with the sort of financial auditing mission that initially led to
their creation.
Together these factors may lock in suboptimal institutional responses to serious
legal problems. Through this case study and thought experiment I hope to highlight three
crucial challenges that follow from that sort of lock-in, and that may be relevant to a large
class of problems: (1) the importance of recognizing the inherent limitations of judicial
review as a means of managing government discretion, (2) the value of envisioning new
institutional designs to manage discretion more effectively, and (3) the need for
reasonable strategies to implement those designs in a politically complicated world. No
one should underestimate judicial review’s enduring value. Instead, it is the stale
discussion of its merits as a means of promoting accountability that must be transcended.
Perhaps the most striking thing about executive discretion is that the problem of trading
off its costs and benefits is so pervasive, yet the means of balancing those costs and
benefits has remained unduly narrow. This article begins the task of broadening the
scope of potential solutions and understanding the forces that shape our perceptions of
whether those solutions even exist.
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I.
AUDITS ENHANCE THE SUPERVISION OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Ordinary citizens tend to carry around a few simple mental narratives about the
stakes involved when government makes such discretionary decisions.9 One of those
narratives recurs perhaps more often than any, and goes something like this. Government
bureaucracies get power from legislators, the “people” who elect the legislators, or maybe
even (among the sporadic, more darkly cynical observers) a shadowy conspiracy of
oligarchs. The frontline employees and officials who work in government bureaucracies
then use their power to regulate working conditions, protect the air, screen containers,
safeguard the borders, or to accomplish a host of other goals that the principals care about
and could not be achieved without giving the government such powers.10 But since that
power can be abused, those to whom it is entrusted must be policed to make sure they
adhere to the proper (legal) rules and standards that are supposed to govern their
decisions.11 In societies like our own, courts are assumed to play a particularly important
role in doing that policing.12 Our public credo makes much of how courts promote
accountability. They scrutinize instances where government uses discretion to target an
individual or group. In doing so, they are assumed to help the public learn what ails the
government’s efforts to protect our welfare and security.13 They’re routinely assigned
responsibility for ensuring that people’s rights are respected, that agencies don’t exceed
their legal powers when they promote security or safety, and that the law is correctly
applied to the millions of people and organizations who are affected by government every
day.14
The preceding assumptions about the role of courts are, of course, wrong. The law
may commit a decision to agency discretion. Courts may be forced by law or custom to
review executive branch actions only with extreme deference. Judges may lack
jurisdiction. In short, when courts weigh in on a great many discretionary decisions to
make sure they’ve been done right, they may have little choice but say: “Glad you’re
doing such a great job.”15 Sometimes legislators explicitly confer enormous discretion,

9

See Mark Schlesinger and Richard R. Law, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 611 (2000).
10
See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988); Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, On Political Representation, 29
BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 109 (1999).
11
See Barry R. Weingast, Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
24 (1997).
12
See, e.g., Martin Shaprio, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J., 1487 (1983).
13
See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003).
14
See generally Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional
Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1998).
15
Courts can restrain egregious government conduct of some kinds, such as those that might give rise to
viable constitutional tort claims. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). But courts proceed with extreme caution in this realm given their
concern that the scope of a claim they recognize (and the remedies they might make available) would
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prohibiting all or most judicial review of certain decisions, by embedding a limiting
provision in an agency’s legal mandate. The law says that the CIA Director, for instance,
has authority to fire employees for being national security risks. It also says he has the
power to define what “national security risk” means, which lets him arbitrarily fire
someone for being gay (he has).16 In other cases, executive agencies have discretionary
powers because prevailing statutory interpretations and constitutional provisions imply
the existence of such power. That’s why prosecutors have the power to choose whom to
charge with little concern that their choices will be questioned in court or in any other
legal forum.17 In still other cases agencies have discretionary power because courts and
other external observers only review certain kinds of executive decisions with great
deference, which leaves the president, the agencies he supervises, and similar executive
authorities with residual control over governance.18 The resulting, legally sanctioned,
executive discretion lets agencies act swiftly, learn to deal with unfamiliar situations, and
(it is often believed), lets the principals hold the executive branch of government
accountable for what it’s done.19 But those powers carry risks as well as rewards – and
striking a reasonable balance between flexibility and constraint turns out to be devilishly
difficult.
A. Executive Discretion is Pervasive
Discretion, as I define it, is the (explicit or implicit) legal flexibility to use
government power – including, but not limited to, personnel, budgets, information, and
legally-sanctioned coercive authority) to affect the world. Government officials use some
discretion virtually every time they do something. Though government actions are rarely
purely discretionary, neither is discretion ever entirely absent. What discretion is present
may come from explicit statutory language, an implicit interpretation of a statute or
constitutional provision, or it could be the result of a certain institutional structure
involving extremely deferential external review, which gives government officials a lot of
power.
Since there’s no such thing as a total absence of discretion when government pays
out welfare support, prosecutes, and otherwise applies the law, the distinctions that
lawyers and policymakers fight over tend to be about whether to give the executive
branch relatively more, or relatively less discretion compared to a certain baseline. When
the President’s lawyers talk about the benefits of discretion, they’re implicitly accepting a
baseline state of the world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government

interfere with some of the more valuable properties associated with executive discretion. See generally
PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
16
Webster, 486 U.S. at 602-04.
17
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). As Culp Davis cogently observed, “[a] judicial trial is
an acceptance of a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute, not a review of it. Even a quick finding of not guilty
may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution.” Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 209 n.21.
18
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
19
See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 793 (2004).
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action.20 That’s a familiar position in the United States and in most other developed
nations (and many developing ones).21 In criminal prosecutions, voting rights cases, and
labor law injunctions, for example, some action of the executive branch (such as
subjecting someone to the detriments associated with being convicted of a crime)
depends on convincing a court to do something. Observers and policymakers may have
different political views about how easy it should be to impose a labor injunction (for
example) or convict someone of a crime. But if they don’t succeed in persuading the
legislature to water down the substantive standard that applies, they’ll have to mount a
vigorous case before a court that is quite persistently unwilling to simply defer to
executive discretion. Even when such review is not occurring, the executive branch
presumably labors in the shadow of the embarrassing possibility that a license grant, a
regulatory rule, a criminal conviction, or a statutory enactment will be invalidated.22 This
implies that we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline of
relatively intrusive judicial review.

20

See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL
724020 (March 29, 2004). The government’s language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers
for the executive branch have taken in this Administration – and not dramatically different (on the core
issue of deference – from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations. It states:
As this Court has observed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority
of the Executive in military and national security affairs. The customary deference that courts
afford the Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context. A
commander’s wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a
quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief
authority. Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations and
intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and
make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe.
Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
21
This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal systems, many of which
assign quite different roles to judicial institutions. The point is that it’s quite common for those different
systems to assign considerable importance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts. See
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99,
101 (1994).
22
Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is enormously complex, but
a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to this effect using qualitative or quantitative
methodologies in different contexts. For some cogent examples, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)(suggesting that NHTSA’s reliance on costly recalls of
questionable safety effects rather than prospective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of
intrusive judicial review in rulemaking); Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998)(discussing the impact of the
“ossification” of rulemaking, where judicial review among other factors shapes agencies’ willingness to use
regulatory authority); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower
Courts, 47 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 205 (2003)(analyzing whether changes in the ideological composition of lower
courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to grant permits for development of
wetlands, and finding that a standard deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the
lower courts decreased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by 14%).
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B. Discretion Is Routinely Managed Through Variations in Standards of Judicial
Deference
Courts and legislatures provide for such review in accordance with a
straightforward pattern. Whether because of their own decisions or because of legislative
mandates, it should hardly seem surprising that courts and legislators seem to manage the
costs and benefits of discretion by varying the deference they give the executive or her
agent. Some decisions get more deference, and others get less.23 As I use the concept
here, deference is not quite the same thing as the “standard of review” that a court of
appeals uses to review lower courts or administrative decisions, nor is it confined to
courts’ review of decisions that allegedly turn on agency statutory interpretations (though
it can certainly encompass this). Instead the concept applies to several considerations
that together determine the stringency of a court’s review of an executive decision. That
bundle of considerations includes the standards of review, the extent of required
procedures a court can monitor (i.e., the “meaningful opportunity to be heard” mentioned
in Hamdi),24 and routine practices that courts use to decide on the extent of the executive
branch’s flexibility to make some kinds of decisions.25 Stringency of review, as I define
it, encompasses among other things the standard of review governing appeals of specific
administrative actions. It is affected by the degree of outright deference given to the
executive branch, and the extent to which courts find through constitutional or statutory
interpretation that a particular decision to be committed by law to agency discretion.
More stringency means a combination of: more rigorous procedures (such as those that
might be imposed on due process groups) that the government must follow before
imposing a cost on someone, a less permissive standard of review for the factual findings
of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less overall deference to the
government’s decision itself. In my terms, when a court says that a six-page declaration
from a Defense Department bureaucrat is enough reason to detain someone for an
indefinite period of time, it is being more deferential.26 When a court says that’s not
enough, because the executive must provide a “meaningful opportunity” for someone so
designated to get notice of the factual basis for their detention and to contest their status,
it is being less deferential.27 And when a court says that a person cannot be detained
(given the legislature’s current authorization) unless someone is charged with a crime, it
is being even less deferential.
The same pattern can be observed when comparing, for example, deferential
versions of the sort of “arbitrary and capricious” and “substantial evidence” review to the
role of a typical court considering the veracity of a prosecutor’s charging document in the
course of a criminal trial. A conviction generally requires convincing the court of an
argument about the particular meaning of a statute, and proving facts establishing the
23
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25
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presence of “elements” of the crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.”28 Specific cases may
involve different doctrinal bases and legal subtleties. But across this diverse doctrinal
territory, one might imagine that a given point on a continuum (ranging from extreme
deference to pronounced stringency) could reflect the extent of the hurdles government
must overcome to prevail in the judicial arena. It also serves to determine the costs
various players will bear once the review process has played out; less deference forces
both the executive and the court to devote greater resources to resolving the relevant legal
and factual questions. The important distinction here is not in the specific doctrines or
procedures involved, but in the fact that under a standard of greater deference (whether
determined by legislative enactments or subsequent judicial interpretation), the executive
branch retains a greater chunk of power to decide how to use its discretion.
When deciding how much of that power to let executive authorities keep, courts
and legislators make an implicit assumption across a bewildering array of contexts. They
appear to make decisions premised on the assumption that a particular degree of
stringency in review will apply, once articulated (and assuming it is actually followed)
across the board to all similarly-situated cases.29 This is perhaps partly a function of
stare decisis and prevailing conceptions of horizontal equity, or perhaps even partly
driven by inflated conceptions of judicial power to ensure that like cases are treated
similarly. In fact courts treat horizontal equity as an important value, where deviations
must be defended.30 The same goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts
implement. This renders troubling (in the eyes of many principled observers) the
prospect of increasing the stringency of review without making the various costs
prohibitive.
C. Audits Can Substitute For, or Supplement, Judicial Review
Now suppose court review isn’t available, that it is considered too costly for some
reason, or that we want to supplement the allegedly laudatory impact of judicial review
on executive behavior in some way. How else might legislators and the public police
executive discretion? One answer can be found in what government organizations
repeatedly do to the public: they audit. By thinking about alternative institutional
arrangements, such as audits, we can get a better sense of the practical and political
opportunities to nudge bureaucracies with discretionary legal powers away from failure.
We can also clarify what our underlying goals are when discretion is reviewed, thereby
trading off various possible ways of solving some of the institutional design problems
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associated with audits (like how courts should be involved, or whether audits should be
publicly disclosed) that might be better or worse suited to achieving particular goals.
As I use the term here, an audit is a sustained, careful evaluation of a discrete
decision drawn from a larger pool. In contrast to financial or more wide-ranging
management audits, the audits of targeted discretion I discuss below treat each
discretionary decision, like a decision to label a group as a specially designated terrorist
organization, as the unit of analysis. Audits of targeted discretion would evaluate the
information supporting the decision, its origins and reliability, contradictory information,
and the broader context in which the decision took place Though audits rarely take
precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to learn what’s going on
in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
Audits associated with taxation are among the most familiar. They take place in
some form in most reliable tax collection systems, which, like our own, rely partially on
self-reports.31 Many tax audits are not entirely random, which reduces their ability to
provide a reliable picture of what’s going on in the world. The less random the audits
are, the less generalizable their results – and the easier it might be to evade them by
avoiding the behaviors that raise the probability of being audited.32 From this
perspective, one of the “purest” tax auditing programs in recent years (in the sense of
being almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program (or TCMP). The following discussion emphasizes the tremendous
informational value of such a program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on the 1988 TCMP.
Noncompliance with individual and corporate income taxes was estimated to cost
the Treasury about 18 percent of actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of
revenue would have amounted to $223 billion. An average tax rate of 22 percent
implies that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate
deductions.33
Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure out the size of the “tax
gap.” The program’s cancellation has limited the government’s ability to know how
much is paid relative to what is owed, and who’s particularly likely to be responsible for
that gap.34
Auditing-type activity also shows up in the pages of court opinions. Suppose
Federal health care regulators and investigators suspect a health care clinic or nursing
home of overcharging the federal government on Medicare payments. The government
sends in investigators. Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by reviewing
each one of its files, investigators use audits to calculate the amount.35 Courts reviewing
31
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this practice have repeatedly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor
one with due process.36 “Sample audits” also make an occasional appearance in class
actions. When they do, courts (and litigants) confronted with an entire class of claims
take a sample of those claims to get a better sense of what’s going on.37
Something similar happens in the private sector, where “your call may be
monitored for quality assurance.” The point is not just to prevent abuses or mistakes in
discrete cases. It’s to learn more – as with tax collection -- about what’s really happening
and how it can be improved. For example, insurance companies sometimes perform a
process of “closed file review,” where they spend more money figuring out whether the
amount of money paid out for a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than
they do paying out the claim itself.38 It’s not hard to see why managers would rather
know what their employers are doing. Nor is it surprising that random audits (at least
when they happen with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the people or
organizations being overseen to evade detection.39
Not surprisingly, the federal government has created several bureaucracies
capable of using audit-type techniques to investigate what government agencies actually
do with their discretion. Very occasionally, government agencies audit the performance
of their own workers.40 The Government Accountability Office (originally the General
Accounting Office, or GAO) was created early in the 20th century primarily to help
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.41 In 1974, legislators
gave the GAO power to review and analyze the implementation of government programs.
Shortly thereafter, beginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten
years or so, legislators began creating “Inspector General” offices in the federal
government.42 Like the GAO, the Inspectors General have the legal power to investigate
how federal officials use their targeted discretion. The existence of these structures
indicates the potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the federal
government uses its targeted discretion. Whether these bureaucracies actually perform
such audits is another matter, to which I return below.
To understand how audits would work, imagine a world much like our own,
where some decisions (like environmental regulatory rules, voting rights regulations, and
criminal convictions) are subject to stringent judicial review. Other executive branch
decisions (like special designation as a terrorist organization or as an enemy combatant)
are subject to less stringent review. For fairly obvious reasons, we (or if you prefer the
parlance of game theory, the “principals”) want to know how the government is using its
36
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discretion. The problem is we have a limited budget to review decisions, and we are
concerned about over-deterring the executive branch. Earlier I noted that a key feature of
judicial review is that courts and legislators tend to pick a standard of deference that’s
supposed to apply to all cases in a particular class. What audits do is to introduce an
alternative means of review that allows for variation in both the standard of deference
used to review cases as well as the number of cases actually reviewed. In exchange for
reviewing fewer cases, whoever is conducting the audits can demand more evidence from
the executive branch, more justification, and more access to information – all at a lower
cost than what would be incurred if the same standard of deference applied to every
decision.43
The process would unfold along the following lines. First, an auditor would
define some discrete set of targeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all summary exclusions at
the border, all enemy combatant designations, all discretionary – as opposed to
mandatory – container inspections, or all decisions to freeze assets). Second, the auditor
would randomly choose some number or percentage of decisions to audit. Third, those
decisions, would be reviewed far more stringently than a court would review the whole
class of decisions. If a court (as with border inspection decisions) provides almost no
review, the auditor would gather all available information about how the decision took
place, what its effect was, what the secondary inspector knew when he denied entry, and
what other agencies know that might be relevant to the decision. If a court reviews
IEEPA designations under a highly permissive version of the “arbitrary and capricious”
and “substantial evidence” tests, the auditor would instead gather information on how an
administrative record was complied – not just on what it purports to say. In doing this,
the auditor would apply some kind of standard (which I discuss below) either drawn from
the purposes of the statutes in question, or perhaps even based on what the executive
branch says it is trying to accomplish through its actions. Fourth, the results of the audit
would be made available to legislators and the public, which may (under certain
conditions) then pressure the agency to make modifications in its conduct. Intelligence
information could be used in these determinations because it can be reviewed in
camera.44 Obviously, a lot in this scenario depends on whether legislators and the public
react to the audits. While they might sometimes ignore those results, the media’s reaction
to GAO and Inspector General reports suggests that these audits could be quite salient.45
Judicial review would continue in the background at whatever standard of deference
courts and legislatures choose – though it’s certainly plausible to think that some courts
might approach their cases differently as a result of what the audits revealed. They might
even evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing whether a reliable audit
43
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system is in place. Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every
aggrieved person or group (that depends on how they’re designed), they would help
legislators, organized interest groups, and the public to learn far more about what
government does than is currently known.46
A simple model serves to demonstrate the potential differences between audits
and traditional judicial review. Models obviously abstract from the real world. While
they should be used cautiously, my aim in using on here is simply to offer a more
concrete illustration of the critical ideas. Begin by accepting the executive branch’s
premise that more intrusive judicial review is a problem because it is too costly, with cost
here referring to the whole gamut of allegedly adverse consequences associated with
grater review stringency. This suggests (plausibly enough) that there is a relationship
between the stringency of judicial review and its cost. The cost of review reflects a
couple of things. We should expect that the more cases reviewed, the higher is the direct
cost incurred by the court (or some other reviewing authority) when examining cases, and
by the executive branch when providing information and defending its actions on an
individual case. Moreover, the more cases reviewed (or at least eligible for review) out
of a total pool of cases, the more that the benefits of targeted discretion might dissipate.
Decisions may be slower (either because of the resources consumed by the review
process, or simply because the fact they will be reviewed leads the executive branch to
make the initial determination more judiciously). The risk of over-deterring may also be
greater as the proportion of cases eligible for review rises towards 100%. On the other
hand, more stringent judicial review is valuable because it is more likely to reveal
problems in targeted discretionary decisions.
A few plausible assumptions illustrate the situation. Let the terms Cd and Ci
denote direct and indirect costs, respectively, of reviewing cases with a particular degree
of stringency. Let Pr( ) denote the probability that a problem is discovered given a
particular degree of stringency in the review process, which is represented by an
increasing parameter S that begins at zero and increases to 1, which represents maximally
intrusive review. Let Nc denote the proportion of cases reviewed in a given class of
cases. Here’s how all this fits together:

46

•

Cd and Ci increase as a linear function of S, such that C=Cd + Ci and C=f(S), such
that one can define a two dimensional space consisting of a cost dimension C
running vertically, and a perpendicular dimension stringency of review dimension
S running horizontally.

•

For any given set of cases and stringency of review, both Cd and Ci increase as Nc
increases. This implies that the slope of the line defining the relationship between
S and C becomes more elastic as the proportion of cases reviewed decreases.

•

Pr( ) increases as a linear function of S, such that one can also define a two
dimensional space consisting of a probability of discovering problems dimension
Pr( ), and a precisely orthogonal stringency of review dimension S.

Depending on the assumptions made about the political system, legislators and the public might respond
to the audits in ways that would provide relief to all or some of the people aggrieved by problematic
applications of targeted executive discretion.
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•

At some levels of stringency, the probability of discovering problems falls below
an acceptable minimum (where “acceptable minimum” means the point below
which, according to a social consensus, the probability of discovering problems
should not fall). There is a unique point on the S dimension (call it Smin),
indicating the minimum acceptable degree of stringency.

•

For any given Nc, there is some point Cmax representing the maximum cost of
review that society is willing to bear in reviewing targeted discretion. Because C
increases as a function S, Cmax corresponds to a maximum degree of stringency of
review (call this Smax).

Figure 1 shows how these parameters interact in situations where judicial review
is likely to work reasonably well. Any point on the stringency axis (at the top and bottom
of the figure) would have corresponding points, indicating the cost of that degree of
stringency and its associated probability of discovering problems, on the two
perpendicular axes. The upper part of the figure shows the relationship between the costs
of review and stringency for a given proportion of cases reviewed. The cost-stringency
line has roughly the same slope as the probability-stringency line in the lower figure,
which indicates the relationship between stringency and the probability of discovering
problems.47 The space between the lowest acceptable bound of review (Smin) and the
highest permissible cost (which corresponds to Smax) is what I call the “feasible review
set.” This is the space where courts (or legislators) have some flexibility in setting the
stringency of the doctrine. Any level of stringency lower than Smin means there won’t be
a high enough probability of discovering problems, and a level higher than Smax
effectively breaks the bank – either because the review process itself becomes too
expensive or because of there is too much interference with the benefits of discretion in
the executive branch.48
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Switch now from thinking about judicial review to thinking about audits, and a
subtle but important difference emerges in the situation. Because we have assumed that
the relationship between C and S becomes more elastic as the proportion of cases
reviewed decreases, then audits allow a higher degree of stringency of review (and
thereby a lower standard of deference) for the same cost. Figure 2 shows how this looks.
In contrast with Figure 1, the slope of the cost-stringency line is now flatter than that of
the probability-stringency line in the lower portion of the figure.49 Which means the
feasible review set suddenly expands dramatically while the costs of review remain the
same. The implication is that, in exchange for lower costs by reviewing a smaller
proportion of cases, the auditor gains the chance to review cases more thoroughly – to ask
47
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for more evidence, to require a more explicit showing of facts in a record, to inquire into
how a particular record was developed, and ultimately, to better understand what the
pressures may have affected the decisionmaker and distorted her decision. What both
Figures 1 and 2 have in common, nonetheless, is that the decisionmaker (whether a
reviewing court or an auditor) could choose a level of stringency above Smin – or that
level of stringency which is associated with the minimum acceptable probability of
discovering problems.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The preceding discussion shows two differences between audits and traditional
forms of judicial review. With audits the costs of audits can be adjusted by changing the
number of cases reviews, and not just the stringency of that review. In addition, audits
would not reflect the distortions imposed by the litigation process. The cases reviewed
would not be a function of who can obtain representation or what particular fact pattern
entices judicial attention. As I explain below, both of these characteristics turn out to be
important in making the case for supplementing judicial review with audits of executive
discretion.
D. Traditional Judicial Review Suffers From Limitations
So far I have shown how audits can substitute for judicial review, but I have not
yet addressed why it would be preferable (from what might be broadly termed a social
welfarist perspective) to live in a world where judicial review is supplemented by audit
review. To understand judicial review’s merits as a way of overseeing executive
discretion, we must review some of the costs and benefits of deviating from the
conventional limited-discretion baseline discussed above. With this review and the aid of
some specific examples involving considerable degrees of executive discretion, we can
better understand what audits can contribute.
Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and court review, any
effort to depart from a baseline of stringent review should be continued on a satisfactory
accounting of the benefit associated with departing from the limited-discretion baseline?
A fairly obvious one is speed, or what is commonly termed “efficiency.” Some decisions
need to be made quickly if they’re going to matter. Suppose policymakers confront a
possible outbreak of avian flu virus. They may consider imposing a quarantine. They
must decide quickly whether American airports will receive flights from the affected
country. To delay the decision effectively becomes a decision to let the planes land.
Even if it is possible to wait, it may cost a lot to do so. The Treasury can wait to freeze a
suspicious charity’s assets, but those assets may soon leave the group’s coffers for some
sleepless island bank secrecy haven. Letting executive authorities have discretion lets
them not only decide quickly – and the saved time can translate into money, extra safety,
and convenience. The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal
government’s national security decisions.50 Nor is it lost on courts and scholars writing
about other aspects of public law – such as those concerned about the “ossification” of
regulatory rules.51 On a related note, less review also saves two kinds of resources: those
50
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the court or other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and those that
the government would spend defending itself. These costs are likely to be especially
salient because courts, relying on some version of stare decisis or horizontal equity
norms, assume they’re fashioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar
cases.52
Another argument for letting government have a relatively free rein in applying
discretion is rooted in the allegedly superior technical competence of the executive
branch.53 The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive branch have
greater expertise than the judges who might review their decisions. This point shows up
time and again in judicial decisions in a wide range of domains, from environmental
policy to police investigations.54 No doubt that expertise is valuable. The more some
reviewing authority intervenes, the greater the risk that expert decisions will be undone.
More intervention may even dilute the incentives of decisionmakers to develop and use
expertise.55
Discretion may also have a role in helping government harmonize competing
goals, trading off some desired goals against further delays (for example) in achieving
less compelling policy objectives. Providing more inspectors for port security might
require a somewhat modified inspection regime in the Northern Border to make up for
the more limited personnel there. If OSHA assigns some of its best inspectors to
implement a new regulation instead of enforcing an old one, it may have to change the
threshold for deciding to inspect a plant in order to make up for the change in the quality
of the officials enforcing the old regulation. Examples like these emphasize how
discretionary decisions do not happen in a vacuum. The president and his advisors may
decide to devote fewer resources to freezing terrorist assets if they feel there’s been a n
improvement in their ability to disrupt the travel plans of suspected terrorists. Regulators
with less resources for reviewing disclosure filings may feel the need to conduct more
inspections. Discretion lets executive authorities harmonize decisions in different policy
domains. Other things being equal, it seems plausible that greater power for courts (or
some other reviewing authority) to intervene and undermine executive decisions would
make it harder for the executive branch to harmonize decisions effectively.56
Finally, courts and commentators sometimes talk about the value of making the
executive branch “accountable” for its decisions. In an ironic twist, the rhetoric of
accountability that so often bolsters arguments for stringent judicial review sometimes
serves precisely the opposite goal. The argument goes something like this. The less that
court (or other external) intervention encroaches on the executive’s domain, the more that
legislators, organized interest groups and the larger public can focus on rewarding or
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punishing the executive (or the inferior officer) for her decisions.57 This position implies
not only a reluctance to see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical scheme
for accountability, but a confidence that an accounting will indeed be rendered to either
superior officers or the public. Thus courts observe (as did this one in declining to
engage in review of prosecutorial discretion) that “while this discretion is subject to
abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecutor’s] duty as an
agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his superiors.”58
These arguments have each have a grain of truth. What they don’t address is how
much – and how easily – discretion can be abused, whether the context is social security
benefit payments, border screening, enemy combatant designations, or prosecutorial
enforcement. Consider, for example, what could be called the “learning costs” problem.
Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who work in them spend their days
(ostensibly) carrying out legal mandates. People who work there do that in part by
relying on expertise. They hone that expertise by learning from their environment, and
correcting their mistakes. But if no external authority monitors the bureaucracy, then
those who work there may be unwilling or unable to learn much of anything. In fact,
several scholars have suggested that external court review helps bureaucratic institutions
learn. That belief is not always fully theorized – and of course court review carries with
it the risks of over-deterring executive branch activity.59 No doubt sometimes an
inspector’s good conscience or an agency’s strong internal culture contribute to
reasonable decisions about what assets to freeze or who should be labeled an enemy
combatant. Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable
circumstances do not always transpire, and that judicial review helps create conditions
that foster learning. I make this claim for two separate reasons. First, a substantial body
of research suggests that people learn when they have reason to do so.60 Other things
being equal, the dilution of review may deprive individuals of reasons to learn (or, at
least, to learn with the same intensity than they would if review were more stringent).
This assumes, quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mistakes can be
embarrassing to people, or that people in the agency may otherwise suffer some costs if
they face some kind of review process that does not go well.61 Second, organizations
develop routines that blind them. As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the
Challenger launch decision:
Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challenger case is how
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational forces that
shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes
57
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with harmful human consequences. The explanation of the Challenger launch is a
story of how people who worked together developed patterns that blinded them to
the consequences of their actions. It is not only about the development of norms
but about the incremental expansion of hormative boundaries: how small changes
– new behaviors that were slight deviations from the normal course of events –
gradually became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.
No rules were violated; there was no intent to do harm. Yet harm was done.62
[Emphasis added].
External review may elucidate things that people inside the organization fail to
appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the absence of
expertise. Which means that even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives
for people to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its abundance
may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken enemy combatant designations,
border inspection decisions, asset freezing determinations, and health or safety
inspections. The larger point is that the most attractive kinds of organizational learning –
where the organization learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently – is
likely to be rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.63 Watering down or
forgoing judicial review altogether leaves the problem of how agencies will learn from
their mistakes, and indeed, how agencies will even realize that they have made a
mistake.64
Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic consequences.
In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb to the temptation to use their
discretion to create an appealing impression among the public. I discuss this problem at
greater length elsewhere,65 but the basic insight is a simple one. Discretionary actions
can serve as a sort of signal that the public (or political superiors) can use in forming
judgments about the competence of the executive branch (or an organization within it).
As long as the public’s impressions of the executive branch’s expertise, success, ability,
and resolve are influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those actions will become
tempting levers to create favorable public perceptions. Frozen assets and speciallydesignated terrorist organizations send the message that the executive branch knows what
it’s doing when it may not. This state of affairs may skew citizens’ ability to evaluate the
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effectiveness of their own government. And the discretionary actions may themselves
have costs, including the creation of perverse incentives for regulated groups,66
diminished compliance with treaties, or simply the individual mistreatment suffered by
individual detainees (for example) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months
and then years before ending in freedom. Finally, just as discretion allows political
authorities to engage in subtle, politically-motivated self-dealing, it can also lead to some
employees engaging in blatant, willful malfeasance.67
No one in their right mind who reflects for more than a moment on these costs
could possibly deny that they must be weighed against discretion’s benefits. Without
accepting the need to balance (in principle), discussions of discretion in courts and
scholarly circles become incoherent. Massive discretion cannot be defended in the
abstract because it is neither inherently good or bad. Its consequences depend on the
substance of the decision, its context, and the complex interplay of incentives and
capacity affecting the decision-maker. Should prosecutors be able to charge whomever
they choose without looking over their shoulder? It depends. Should the president retain
the power to control who’s detained as an enemy combatant or what assets, of which
charity, get frozen? All these powers are granted not because discretion’s inherently
valuable but because courts and legislatures claim good things will come as a result, so
that the costs of discretion are worth bearing. So airport screeners keep choosing
passengers for secondary inspection, welfare offices keep paying benefits or denying
applications for them, and prosecutors keep choosing whether to charge a suspect.
Which brings us to the question of how to strike that balance between costs and
benefits in the specific contexts that together constitute a messy, tangled world of
politics, institutional pressures, economic constraints, ambitious legal mandates and
uncertainty. Consider some examples.
E. Examples
i. Freezing Financial Assets of Suspected Terrorist Supporters
Governments try to freeze the assets of groups that threaten their national
security. If a charity is raising funds for terrorists, the U.S. government will want to
freeze those assets. Doing so reduces the chance that those assets will fund the lives of
terrorists but it also works as a sort of punishment against people or groups who should
have known better.
The law gives government officials some powerful tools to do this. One of them,
designations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or “IEEPA”),68
lets the president “block,” or freeze access to, any property subject to United States
jurisdiction, when two conditions apply. First, the property in question must be
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something in which a foreign country or national has an interest.69 This constraint turns
out to be not much of a limitation on the president’s power, since courts have found that
the “foreign” interest does not have to be a legal interest of any kind. The mere fact that
an organization has foreign beneficiaries may be enough, in fact, for a court to say that it
has a “foreign interest.”70 Second, the president must use this power only during an
emergency.71 That’s not much of a limitation, either. The emergency must involve an
“unusual and extraordinary threat” giving rise to the emergency must have its source
partly outside the United States.72 It might pose a threat to the “national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States.”73 The combined effect of this expansive
language and traditional judicial deference on matters of national security and foreign
affairs have made it relatively easy for presidents to declare a number of emergencies
(about ten of which are currently in effect).74 Courts have yet to find that, under the
terms of IEEPA, a supposed emergency does not, in fact, exist.
In a series of executive orders, the President’s delegated authority under IEEPA to
the Secretaries of State and Treasury. Under the resulting system, the Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Asset Control blocks the assets of groups that branded “Specially Designated
Terrorist Organizations.”75 Once a group becomes a specially designated terrorist
organization, it loses control over its fate. As a lawyer for a designated group recently
wrote, the organization is likely to shut down and lay off its employees:
Acting under the blocking notice, government agents entered HLF's offices in
Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, and California, seized and removed the contents
(including everything from documents to office equipment to employees' personal
effects), and froze HLF's bank accounts, which contained millions of dollars in
charitable contributions. As of that day, HLF ceased operations. Its employees
lost their jobs.76
The impact of OFAC’s orders is to block the organization’s funds, regardless of where in
the financial system they happen to be. The designation also means that people providing
“material support” to the group commit a serious federal crime.77
Take a closer look at how the court reviews the government’s designations. In the
recent Holy Land Foundation case, the State and Treasury departments used IEEPA
powers delegated to them by the president.78 Agency staff issued a blocking order. The
blockage limits what the charity can do. Its powers and options are drastically
constrained as a result of the blocking order. When the court considers whether a
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designation was legal, it defines a certain standard of review to circumscribe its inquiry.
Specifically, it considers whether the decision is “arbitrary and capricious” under the
terms of the Administrative Procedure Act. But it interprets IEEPA and the national
security context in which these decisions take place to require a highly deferential form
of review. Now the District Court took that standard and seemed to push it about as far
as it would go. The key factual question, the District Court and the litigants agreed, was
the extent of HLF’s connection to Hamas, another specially designated terrorist
organization (and one that, at least at this point, few people had reason to doubt as a
“terrorist organization”). The district court conducted a careful examination of the record
and uncovered “ample” evidence that:
(1) HLF has had financial connects to Hamas since its creation in 1989; (2) HLF
leaders have been actively involved in various meetings with Hamas leaders; (3)
HLF funds Hamas-controlled charitable organizations; (4) HLF provides financial
support to the orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF’s
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants reliably
reported that HLF funds Hamas.79
This kind of review might strike some observers as particularly thorough. That
perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons. First, the court considers only whether
the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” and based on “substantial evidence,” not
whether it was right or wrong. That determination, moreover, reflects a statutory text
(the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court’s inquiry extremely deferential
and perhaps helps explain why so few of these determinations get challenged in court
(because it’s not clear what will be gained). Second, as a practical matter, the court’s
inquiry (even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the envelope in terms of
the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record that the government itself
compiles. As the district court itself noted in this case, the arbitrary and capricious
standard “does not allow the courts to undertake their own fact-finding, but to review the
agency’s record to determine whether the agency’s decision was supported by a rational
basis.”80 That record may be a tremendously accurate complication of the government’s
evidence. Or it may be patently misleading. Nothing requires that the government report
evidence tending to cast doubt on its contentions.81 Nor does the court interview the
sources on which the record is based. Which means that, even in the best of
circumstances, the court’s review is only as good as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review is likely to exert only a limited
impact on the quality of that record. If that record turns out to be an empty folder, then
the court would almost certainly vacate the designation without ever getting to the
arbitrary and capricious test, because of the absence of “substantial evidence.” On the
other hand, officials who want to evade that possibility need only make sure there is a
thick enough record to make it hard for the court to conclude that such a record makes the
79
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designation look totally arbitrary. The thing is, the record itself is based on decisions that
are essentially immune from review. Which makes them prone to the familiar political
pressures and distortions that permeate government bureaucracy.82
ii. Government-Run “No Fly” Lists
When passengers check in at American airports, their names are compared to
those on a list provided to airlines by the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).83 Predictably enough, the point of the list is to thwart the (travel) plans of those
who might prove dangerous on board a flight. A subsidiary purpose may also be to
promote the questioning and apprehension of suspicious individuals who may be sought
by law enforcement authorities. Although the aforementioned list (technically an element
of a system known as CAPPS I) is considered by TSA to be an important component of
aviation security, recent efforts have focused on supplementing it with a more elaborate
safeguard.84 The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new system,
since shortly after September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays.85 The
advent of the new system, however, is unlikely to lead to the complete demise of some
version of the current process, as the government will likely retain a “core” list of people
who should be detained when they attempt to travel.86
In practice, TSA and the airlines have run into problems using the list. It is not
applied consistently. Sometimes people whose names are merely similar to those on the
list are detained. It appears as though even individuals who are actually named on the list
are virtually never completely denied the chance to fly; they are instead detained, at times
forced to miss their flight, and subjected to extensive questioning. Even supposing
assuming some of the problems with the list’s use could be remedied, it would seem as
though there should be some procedure to police the list, so that people who are
erroneously placed there could be taken off.
Nothing of the sort exists.87 Instead, people who plainly should not be on the list
(including, for example, a member of the Air Force reporting for duty) are bewildered to
learn that they cannot even find out how their name appeared on the list, let alone what
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must be done to remove it.88 TSA may be understandably reluctant to reveal the quality
of its methods and sources, either because it seeks to avoid sensitizing potential terrorists
to the extent of their strengths or alerting the larger public to the extent of their
weaknesses. But that still leaves the question of how the quality of the list will be
policed. The question becomes more pressing given the apparent absence of any reliable,
consistent review mechanism to ensure the names on the list belong there.89 Reasonable
people can differ with respect to how much discretion TSA should have in deciding what
information to evaluate when deciding whether to place someone on the list, and whether
(on the basis of that information) a name belongs there. What’s harder to dispute is the
absence of any statutory provision for administrative or judicial mechanisms to resolve
the problem. This leaves aggrieved parties with the option of a lawsuit claiming that their
treatment as a result of being placed on the list amounts to a due process violation. Such
a lawsuit is currently pending. But regardless of the outcome, the no-fly list problem
illustrates why due process claims may be a poor vehicle for policing this type of
discretion. Assuming the litigants persuade a court that the problems they confront while
flying amount to an interference with a protected liberty or (less likely) property interest,
they would still have to persuade a court that existing procedures violate the interestbalancing test rooted in Mathews v. Eldrige.90 That would be a tough sell given the
strength of the interest the government would assert in promoting aviation security.
Which leaves the quality of the list dependent on the bureacracy’s behavior.
iii. Launching Major Occupational and Environmental Safety Inspections
In criminal justice, people and organizations tend to face severe penalties only
after they’re convicted or admit their guilt. When legislators approve statutes creating
major regulatory programs, they often build in a different mechanism. Implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly), their enactments recognize that using the criminal justice system to
punish violations is cumbersome. Instead, many laws allow regulators to levy fines or
issue orders restricting certain activities with more limited (if any) court intervention.
Although they vary in the relevant legal standard or the size of the maximum fine, those
orders have an effect before judicial intervention. Even after that intervention, it’s not at
all clear how well the stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to
some varation of the “arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse of discretion” standards) strikes
the most desirable balance between restraining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
Consider two examples.
When the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has some reason to think businesses are violating their general
duty to provide a safe working environment, it can issue abatement orders and citations.91
Parties who fail to abate as the agency requires face additional penalties, as do those who

88

Some individuals apparently on the list who write their congressional representative have been told to
bring along multiple forms of identification to prove they are not the person named on the list. This
obviously does not address the problem of the person actually named on the list who seeks to contest that
designation.
89
See GAO Report, supra note 83, at 13.
90
See Green, 351 F.Supp 2d. at 1124-7 (denying due process challenge to the no-fly list from passengers
who had been detained but eventually allowed to fly).
91
See 29 U.S.C. §§664(a), 666(a), 666(b), and 666(c).

26
engage in “serious” or willful” violations (even before an abatement order is issued).92
Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is expensive, which
means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines OSHA tends to assess instead of
contesting them. Penalties for violating compliance orders are considerably more severe
under environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.93 Under that statute, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative Compliance Order
(ACO) on the basis of “any information available to it,” directing a regulated party – such
as an electricity generation plant – or state agency to comply with the Clean Air Act’s
requirements. While the ACO doesn’t allow EPA to impose finds or other penalties
directly, the order triggers provisions imposing civil or criminal penalties for violation of
the order.94 Under the terms of the Act, it initially appeared as though judicial review of
an ACO was supposed to focus on whether the regulated party violated the terms of the
order, not whether the EPA was right to issue it in the first place.95 This has
understandably raised questions about how the order itself should be reviewed. In recent
cases, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have left some uncertainty about
whether the ACO structure withstands constitutional scrutiny given its due process
implications. At least one circuit court found ACOs not to be final agency actions (which
is required for circuit court review in these cases), thereby rendering them unreviewable
and raising the due process problem.96 The Supreme Court declined to review this case,
and instead – in a separate case – upheld a Ninth Circuit opinion holding ACOs to be
final agency actions and reviewing them under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.97
In both cases, the relevant agencies retain considerable discretion in imposing
compliance orders. OSHA obviously has it when it issues citations and abatement orders,
some of which are not challenged subsequently. The environmental orders must survive
arbitrary and capricious review if challenged (in circuits that didn’t find the whole
structure unconstitutional), but that leaves the agency the power to compel behavior in
the absence of a challenge, and even if arbitrary and capricious review is not as
deferential in this context is it is with asset freezes (because of the national security
dimension of those cases), it still leaves the court applying a fairly deferential standard of
review to a decision that can be based on “any available information.” It’s quite plausible
that the extent of resulting stringency in review is a reasonable compromise if the
standard is going to be applied across the board, to every compliance order. It’s also
quite possible that such review will not say much about the quality of compliance order
decisions, which could (or perhaps should) ultimately affect the extent of confidence in
the regulatory structures. Put differently, better review of regulatory decisions to impose
compliance orders could change the bundle of substantive powers and penalties that
could be acceptable to an enacting legislative and interest group coalition.
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F. Audits Can Ameliorate the Limitations of Traditional Judicial Review.
The preceding examples hint at a basic problem with managing executive
discretion: unfortunately, sometimes judicial review is bound to fail when it comes to
striking a balance between the aforementioned costs and benefits in the preceding
domains. Figure 3 indicates the problem. What if a reasonable amount of review is
simultaneously prohibitively expensive and extremely valuable? Imagine, for example, a
situation where the cost-stringency function actually looks quite different from the
probability-stringency function. Suppose, for example, that the first function is basically
a linear one, just as in Figures 1 and 2. Stringency pushes up the cost of review in a
linear fashion. But (as the lower portions of Figure 3 indicate) imagine that the
relationship between stringency of review and the probability of discovering problems is
starkly discontinuous. That is – a substantial increase in the stringency of review yields a
very small appreciable benefit in terms of Pr ( ), even though the cost is still increasing
in a linear fashion as the stringency does. Then suddenly there is a substantial increase.
This sort of relationship might describe situations where most of the problems affecting
targeted discretionary decisions involve complicated willful malfeasance rather than
simple mistakes. The decisionmakers might engage in a concerted effort to cover up
their tracks – which could only be detected with an extraordinarily thorough
investigation.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Now put this together with a relatively low maximum acceptable cost (Smax),
which is what the court may set if the decision has to do with national security. And
notice what this does to the feasible review set. Essentially, it disappears. This implies
that at least in some instances where targeted discretion is used, there may be no feasible
review set, because the cost of reviewing discretionary decisions at the level of stringency
necessary to actually have a credible chance of detecting problems far exceeds the
maximum socially-acceptable cost of review.
Things look a little different if we use audits instead of traditional judicial review.
The right side of Figure 3 tells the story. As with Figure 2, the slope of the coststringency line is flatter (more elastic), which leads to a higher stringency of review for
any given cost that is paid for review. The result creates a small feasible review set –
enough room for the auditor to avoid exceeding the maximum cost yet still have a quite
reasonable opportunity to detect problems afflicting discretionary decisions.
When it comes to detecting those problems, audits hold another advantage over
traditional judicial review. By its nature, litigation produces a biased sample. The cases
we learn about are the ones that get litigated, and under various plausible conditions those
cases are not the only ones likely to involve valid claims.98 As Bill Simon’s pointed out
in the welfare context, for example, this pattern can seriously distort our understanding of
a policy’s strengths and weaknesses. It can also lead to court decisions may privilege
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existing claimants over potential ones.99 This doesn’t mean that litigation and judicial
review are not valuable in other ways. They can vindicate the interests of people who are
legally and morally entitled to a proverbial “day,” in court, or to a set of special remedies
for which litigation is the best rationing device. Litigation harnesses the intricate
machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to articulate and clarify legal norms in the context
of specific cases. Rulemaking could let agencies “move from vague or absent statutory
standards to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and understanding
develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when the subject matter permits, to precise
and detailed rules.”100 But these modes of inquiry are like discretion itself: replete with
strengths and weaknesses. They should be treated accordingly and supplemented with
audits.101
Notice that getting these benefits depends on making at least a few assumptions
about the powers of the “auditor,” though I suspect they are not entirely implausible.
Specifically, the auditor needs to be in a better position to discover problems in the use of
targeted discretion than the bureaucracy being reviewed. This probably means three
things: (a) that the auditor is motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate
them), thereby avoiding some of the willful malfeasance and politically-oriented selfdealing problems that bureaucracies have because of their political context; (b) that the
auditor has sufficient abilities to evaluate the discretionary decision, perhaps in part
through reference to some explicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such
decisions; and (c) that the auditor is at least somewhat better than the decisionmakers
being reviewed at avoiding some of the more subtle mistakes that afflict discretionary
decisionmaking. Tempting as it may be to collapse these conditions into an “expertise”
parameter, it’s important to recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more
ambiguous term than is often recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet potentially quite
dangerous two-edged sword: what makes some bureaucratic decisionmakers blind to the
complexities of the problems they face is precisely their expertise in defining those
problems in a standard, predictable fashion that often turns out to be wrong.102 Obviously
the auditor(s) must know something of what it means to correctly freeze assets or assess
regulatory penalties, but it’s not obvious if that implies the sort of familiarity that allows
a generalist judge to handle, say, criminal and complex tort cases, or whether it’s more
akin to the kind of specialization one already observers in the GAO and IG offices.103
Whether it’s possible to generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on
how to resolve questions about the details of the institutional design, to which I turn
below.
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II.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS ARE TRACTABLE
A. Audits Can Be Adapted to Address Multiple Forms of Discretion
The preceding examples and discussion suggest that a certain kind of discretion,
which could be called “targeted discretion,” may be especially (though by no means
uniquely) suited to audits. This is the kind of discretion showcased in the preceding
examples. As Kenneth Culp Davis recognized a generation ago, the government is
replete with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where “the usual
quality of justice” may be quite low.104 Such discretion, showcased in the preceding
examples, primarily involves specific, targeted decisions whose primary effect is on
specific individuals and groups.105 Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying
some implicit or explicit legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy
basis (i.e., “enemy combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them linked to AlQaeda”) that the executive branch itself has articulated as a rationale for these
decisions.106 Targeted discretion stands in contrast to broader policy judgments. Those
judgments involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant policy
considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a regulatory rule or the content
of an executive order.
Obviously, some policy judgments are designed precisely to affect targeted
discretion. The Social Security Administration promulgates standards governing benefit
payments, thereby making a policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion.
When government freezes allegedly terrorist assets, the State and Treasury Departments
implement statutory standards from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), as interpreted through policy judgments in the president’s executive orders.
But despite their overlapping contours, these different sorts of discretion should
nonetheless be distinguished. Though others may disagree, it seems as though policy
judgments call for a different kind of review compared to targeted discretionary decisions
that so often involve applying rules or standards to a particular set of facts. Whatever the
arguments for deferring to the executive branch when an agency writes a rule or a
president signs an executive order, those arguments seem at least somewhat weaker when
the executive branch claims to be applying a standard to the facts. In the latter case the
implicit claim is: “we may have to apply some judgment, but when we detain someone as
an enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an industrial plant, there’s no question
about the purpose we are serving. We’re enforcing the law.”
No doubt sometimes government officials will argue that the details of a policy
judgment – like precisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen –

104

Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 216.
Targeted discretion bears some resemblance to the concept of “informal adjudication” long discussed by
administrative law scholars. For a brief discussion of the definitions associated with “informal
adjudication” and some of the doctrinal problems implicit in this category of administrative action, see
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057 (2004).
106
See Brief for Respondent, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 7, at 12.
105

30
should not be made entirely public.107 They might also argue that standards reflecting
policy judgments should develop organically in response to experience (what would
Diane Vaughan say to that?), instead of being fixed ahead of time. Even if one finds
these positions attractive on the surface, it seems easier to think about them if we accept
at least some distinction between government decisions that fix a standard that is
supposed to apply across cases and those decisions that apply standards (or even quite
general values) to specific cases. Though some may even insist that certain discretionary
decisions involving national security (for example) are entirely immune from any
standard,108 this seems hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent imperative: that
government decisions should not be arbitrary.
Audits of executive discretion may be viable even outside domains where their
utility is most readily observable. As I note in Part IV, it may be possible to modify
audits to shed light on applications of discretion drawn from a sparse set of decisions, or
on policy discretion exercised in the course of rulemaking, for example, may nonetheless
still be suitable for some kind of modified audit.109 Another complication is epitomized
by cases like Webster, where existing law fails to define a standard against which conduct
can be assessed.110 Obviously, there would not be much discretion to audit if the domain
were restricted to instances where a clear legal standard already existed. Ironically, in
many circumstances where statutes are exceedingly vague – as with the Sherman
Antitrust Act – a standard nonetheless emerges from the process judicial review itself.
The absence that in some contexts is precisely what makes audits desirable. In the
section that follows I discuss how such a standard might be derived by the auditor from
overt executive—branch assertions or through reasonable interpretations of related
constitutional, statutory, and policy principles.
B. Most Institutional Design Problems Have Plausible Solutions
Lurking just beneath the surface are practical questions of institutional design.
My goal here is mostly to acknowledge those questions and begin thinking about how
they might be solved. Resolving them completely would take some considerable
attention to the particular kind of targeted discretionary decision that needs to be
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reviewed, and to the political and institutional context affecting the agency (or agencies)
making those decisions.
One question, for example, is how many decisions should be reviewed. The short
answer is it depends on the total costs that can be incurred during the review process
(both in terms of direct costs and in terms of the cost of limiting discretion). In keeping
with the assumption that review increases as a function of the number of cases reviewed,
the lower the “budget” for reviewing, the smaller the number of cases that can be
reviewed. But if the budget is flexible, then how many cases would be “enough”? Think
about this problem by envisioning two different kinds of situations that might arise.
Sometimes there may be thousands, or tens of thousands, of targeted discretionary
decisions to audit – as with border screening decisions or container inspections. In those
situations, we might apply some of the counter-intuitive insights from probability theory.
Those theories suggest that the accuracy of inferences drawn from analyzing a sample of
cases depends on the number of cases sampled, and not necessarily on the total
proportion of cases drawn from a population.111 A sample of 500 cases, for example,
might be associated with a confidence interval of plus or minus 6%, and one of a
thousand cases drives the range down to about plus or minus 3%. The number of cases
audited from a large number of cases would then depend at least partly on the desired
confidence interval. But other factors would also matter. The more it is important to
constrain perceived executive abuses, the greater the number of cases that should be
audited. One might even envision a sliding scale, where the proportion of cases audited
grows in response to the results of earlier audits with a smaller number of cases. All of
these considerations then need to be weighed against the two kinds of costs (direct and
indirect) that review implies.
What if we’re dealing with domains with smaller numbers of cases (say, a
population of less than 1000 cases, as with Specially-Designated Terrorist
Organizations)? Here, cost constraints could so limit the number of audited cases that it
would not be realistic to expect very reliable confidence intervals. Nonetheless, audits
would still serve the useful purpose of constraining executive authorities, who would
know that some proportion (ranging, initially, between 10 and 20 percent depending on
cost) of their decisions would be carefully scrutinized to make sure they’re done
effectively.112
In both cases, one important question is whether the number of cases would
include both instances where targeted discretion resulted in some sanction or cost being
imposed (creating the potential for so-called Type I errors), as well as those instances
where it was not imposed (Type II errors). For example, should someone audit just those
cases where a charity was labeled a Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations, or also
those where sanctions were not imposed? It’s quite likely that we would learn a good
deal from including the cases where powers were not used. But this would raise two
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problems that need to be resolved later. First is deciding whether the expanded
population of cases should include the whole universe (i.e., every charity, or – say –
every charity operating in the Middle East) or just “near misses” (charities that attracted
the attention of State, Treasury, the CIA, or the NSC but, perhaps because of political
considerations, were not specially-designated). The former is more accurate but would so
quickly consume auditing resources that it may not be feasible. The latter is simpler but
less accurate. The second problem is overcoming the likely political resistance (from the
executive branch, who would already have reason to resist audits) that comes from
expanding the scope of review even further. This is a more general problem to which I
return below.
Another recurring question is who exactly would do the audits. Some observers
may insist that courts may lack the inclination, legal authority, culture, or expertise
necessary to engage directly in audits, though they could probably appoint masters to do
some of this work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the
existence of reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for audits as a remedy
in the (unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals bureaucratic failures.113 By rewarding
bureaucracies with reliable audit structures, courts could advance two interrelated
objectives. They could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality of
discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially-relevant standard of quality
encompassing, for example, reductions in the probability of obvious mistakes), and they
would be creating the conditions for enriching the in formation on the basis of which a
court can resolve specific cases. To the extent that courts run into Vermont Yankee
problems,114 legislators could create an article I court with a distinctive mission and
resources to build specialized capacity – or an entirely separate bureaucracy. Among
existing agencies, the GAO and IG Offices are best positioned to do this sort of work
(though, as I note below, they have largely avoided doing so). In short, a combination of
judicial and legislative innovation could lower barriers preventing Article III courts from
more easily encouraging audits, which could also be performed by existing federal audit
bureaucracies. I discuss the political challenges to these scenarios in Part IV.
Whatever the institutional structure, the auditor (let’s use that term for now)
would probably need the power to compel production of evidence and testimony, along
with a cadre of independently-funded investigators. Otherwise it would be hard for the
auditor to delve into enemy combatant designations or container inspections more
aggressively than a court could. Sensitive information could be reviewed in-camera
(something that would further weaken the argument that review is impossible because the
information involved is too sensitive.115 Because this problem has been so often
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managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to audits relying on it is a red herring.
Recent history is full of examples where this problem has been solved.116 In addition to
courts reviewing the information in camera, high profile commissions like the 9/11
Commission and expert working groups routinely get security clearances and access to
classified information.117 The resulting, publicly disclosed work product either omits
classified information or provides some redacted summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or not, what
standard would the auditor use to evaluate it? Ideally the statutes or constitutional
provisions implicated in the discretionary decisions would provide some standard for the
auditor to use, even when the standard is too vague for courts to apply. Or the auditing
authority can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doctrines together
could be taken to imply conditions on the use of discretionary powers.118 The auditor
could even use statements from the executive branch itself to see whether the audited
cases seem to be consistent with those statements.119 In some circumstances, where the
executive refuses to articulate an explicit standard to fill in gaps left by executive,
legislative, or judicial silence, the auditor itself could articulate a reasonable standard
(which is, by the way, what the GAO and IG do in related context, when they audit
“broad management practices”). The standard might reflect insights drawn from
constitutional interpretation, policy considerations, or even statutes’ legislative history.
A final issue is what to do with the results of the audits. The question turns on
whether audits are expected to provide an independent remedy for aggrieved individuals
and groups – like a court proceeding would – or whether they are simply expected to
inform the judgments of legislators and the larger public. One possibility is to announce
the results of the audits (minus the sensitive information). What this would accomplish
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depends on the reactions of legislators and the mass public, which can vary depending on
the circumstances.120 Another possibility is to give relief (or impose belated sanctions)
whenever audits reveal problematic cases. A woman improperly barred from entering the
country could be allowed to return. Assets that should not have been frozen could be
unblocked. Enemy combatants could be set free. This is certainly a principled position,
though it obviously raises certain costs associated with the audits.121 A third approach is
for the results of audits to trigger additional procedural standards, such as review of more
decisions and (perhaps) greater judicial scrutiny. The choice among these alternatives is
likely to depend heavily on some of the political considerations I discuss in Part III.
What’s important is to think of the choice not only in terms of what benefits could be
provided to aggrieved individuals, but also (more generally) how different remedial
schemes are likely to impact agencies’ willingness to learn from their mistakes and
structure its work to avoid future abuses. In short, through careful institutional
engineering, analogies to existing, institutions, and some experimentation, most of the
“problems” identified can be solved. We might then ask whether they have been solved
already.
III.
REFORMS CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH THE STATUS QUO
The value of supplementing judicial review with audits of executive discretion
depends largely on whether or not something like these audits already occurs. Audits of
targeted discretion may sound like exactly the sort of work that the GAO and the IG
Offices already do. These audit bureaucracies were, after all, created to audit the
government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include investigating the management
of government programs.122 Their activities are sometimes directed by legislators, who
(in turn) can proceed with their own audits. Do they?
A. Federal Bureaucracies Do Not Ordinarily Perform Audits
For the audit bureaucracies the answer is basically “no.” These agencies do a
tremendous amount of interesting (and probably sometimes quite valuable work) on
bureaucratic performance. The scope of their authority is quite broad. The GAO, for
example, has the power to examine “any matter” relating in some way to the
disbursement of public money.123 The Inspector General offices in federal departments
have a similarly broad mandate.124 Yet they rarely seem to do rigorous audits of targeted
executive discretion.

120

See Asher Arian, Political and Economic Interactions with National Security Opinion: The Gulf War
Period in Israel, 43 J. CONFLICT RES. 58 (1999); David O. Sears et al., Political System Support and Public
Response to the Energy Crisis, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 56 (1978).
121
Although I do not develop the argument here, one might imagine a situation where the designers of the
audit system would trade-off the ability to grant relief in exchange for the political and economic resources
to audit more cases or to do so more intensely. That’s the sort of bargain that supporters of “truth
commissions” are willing to make.
122
See infra notes 124, 125, and 142.
123
31 U.S.C. § 712 (1).
124
See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452,92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).

35
There is some literature on the historical origin, legal jurisdiction, organization,
and culture of these audit bureaucracies. But we know relatively little about what the
reports of these audit bureaucracies are about, what methods they use to develop their
analyses, whether these reports contain recommendations that agencies actually
implement, and whether any of this gets media attention. These questions are obviously
relevant here because they affect whether there is a deficit of the kinds of audits I
recommend, and their answers help us learn something about how audit bureaucracies
might go about doing more of what I recommend. To begin engaging some of these
questions, I can present some initial results from a more extensive ongoing study of the
audit bureaucracies. The data were obtained primarily from the GAO and IG Offices
websites, or (in some cases) directly from the GAO. Four trained research assistants have
worked with me to code many of these reports and gather additional data about key
agencies. Among other things, our goal has been to see how frequently the GAO and IG
Offices do targeted discretion audits of the kind I recommend above. The results, shown
on Figure 4, indicate how rare this is. The figure divides reports on the basis of whether
they do something like a targeted discretion audit. Only a small number of reports appear
to do anything even remotely resembling an audit of executive discretion, and even
among those reports the focus is only on a small subset of the discretionary authority.
Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in administrative systems like those
governing aviation security. But audits of discretion are altogether missing for a number
of categories of decisions, including “no fly” lists, enemy combatant designations,
individuals removed at the border and not allowed to apply for asylum, and
administrative compliance orders from agencies like OSHA. For instance, the GAO’s
otherwise thorough report on the Transportation Security Agency’s computerized
aviation security system shows how carefully the agency reviewed the architecture of the
computer algorithm and the management practices associated with the systems. It did
not, however, pick a subset of names to inquire exhaustively how they ended up on the
list or what evidence supported that determination.125
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
My preliminary data on the GAO and IG Offices also lets me anticipate and offer
a partial response to two skeptical views about the idea of audits. First, would anyone in
the public actually care about the results of the audits? After all, much of the idea is
predicated on the notion that there may be political consequences to revealing how
discretion is being used. This is particularly important if the scheme is not designed to
deliver a direct remedy to people affected by the reviewed cases. Second, wouldn’t
agencies simply ignore the results of the audits? If they did, then the promised learning
bonus from audits would be unlikely to materialize.
Even at this early point in the empirical phase of the project, it appears as though
GAO and IG Office reports get a considerable amount of attention in the print and
television media. The following figure shows the number of stories in the New York
Times and in transcripts of television news stories between January 2002 and January
2005 mentioning the GAO or IG Offices. Figure 5a shows the number of New York
Times articles mentioning the audit bureaucracies. Nearly a thousand do. A random
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sample of 200 of those news stories indicates that, while only about 3% of the stories
involving the GAO appear on page 1, about 10% of those mentioning the IG Offices do
so. Audit bureaucracies are also discussed on broadcast news and cable channels. Even
in these media, nearly a hundred news segments mention the various IG Offices, and
about 30 mention the GAO.126
[FIGURES 5]
What about recommendations from auditors being ignored? I have obtained data
on all the 10,000 or so recommendations made by the GAO over the last 15 years. After
the GAO makes recommendations to an agency in its reports, what it does is to follow up
through interviews, additional investigation, document reviews, and queries to the agency
leadership. It then determines (on the basis of these qualitative methods) whether a given
recommendation is implemented sometime during the next four years.127 It turns out that
a whopping 79% of recommendations are implemented. Obviously there’s a lot more
work to be done on these recommendations. For example, the extent to which
recommendations are adopted may be endogenous to what the recommendation is – with
simpler ones (i.e., “write a report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the Secret
Service”) being implemented much more than complicated or difficult ones (“reduce the
extent to which the Secret Service works on simple credit card fraud cases instead of
critical infrastructure protection”).
I strongly suspect that the adoption of
recommendations is influenced by political factors, such as the extent of division in
appropriations and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the agency in question. It’s
also quite likely that departments with different bureaucratic structures, institutional
cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige, have different reactions to the GAO
recommendations. What makes little sense is to blithely reject the relevance of these
audit bureaucracies – even if they don’t currently do the sorts of audits that would help us
learn more about the use and abuse of targeted discretion.
B. Neither Do Legislators
Another possible setting where targeted discretion audits could take place is in the
legislature, where hearings to oversee the bureaucracy are routine and legislators often
complain loudly about what agencies have done. As it turns out, most legislative
oversight activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing targeted
discretion. In Part III I suggest some of the reasons why, as with the audit bureaucracies,
there seem to be so few audits of targeted discretion. In what follows I just want to
provide a brief outline of what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how
this is different from targeted discretion audits.
Soon after legislators arrive in Washington, many of them almost invariably find
that “oversight” of the bureaucracy has big payoffs. It lets them achieve desired policy
goals. It also lets them claim credit for making the government work more efficiently
and effectively. As a consequence, legislative oversight activity takes on a bewildering
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array of forms, including – among others – formal committee and subcommittee hearings,
staff investigations of bureaucratic practices, direct contact between a legislator and an
agency’s leadership, meetings with the White House to enlist its support in pressing a
bureaucracy into service, and control of the appropriations process.128 In the mid-1980s,
political scientists Mat McCubbins and Tom Schwartz introduced what has become an
incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of the
bureaucracy.129 Police patrol oversight involves legislators using their time, staff, and
other resources to engage in fairly constant vigilance of agency outputs – primarily
through staff investigations and committee hearings. In contrast, “fire alarm” oversight
requires less constant attention from legislators and their staff. Instead, legislators wait
for “fire alarms” to be pulled by interest groups and portions of the public (occasionally,
perhaps when galvanized by media attention to some perceived regulatory problem). To
encourage this sort of activity, legislators create procedures such as the federal
Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act that let groups more
easily learn what’s going on. Legislators rely on these parties to assist (implicitly) in the
oversight process. In short, fire alarms involve two related features: (a) reliance on
interest groups (or, on occasion, a politically engaged citizenry), and (b) episodic
legislative responses to instances where these groups
The fire alarm concept is almost the opposite of a random audit. Unless
legislators directly create a procedure to audit targeted discretion (they haven’t so far),
then fire alarms would virtually never involve auditing, but rather sharp responses when
problems have already surfaced. Moreover, because targeted discretion often (though not
always) affects individuals or groups without ready access to political power, fire alarm
oversight would be particularly unlikely to uncover problems. In contrast, police patrol
methods are much more consistent with the kind of audits I describe. Yet there is little
evidence from congressional testimony and hearings that this is the sort of oversight that
legislators do directly. In fact, what their public statements seem to suggest is that if
anyone is doing the kinds of audits that reveal problems with government, it’s the GAO
and the IG Offices, not their own staff.130
No doubt that congressional investigations often uncover important trends or
problems in bureaucratic activity, whether they are triggered by fire alarms or they arise
from more pervasive police patrol methods. Nonetheless, those very same investigations
also run into trouble getting access to information about how discretionary decisions are
made. Moreover, while it is perhaps it’s true that some forms of legislative control can
substitute for other mechanisms – like audits – two basic facts might nonetheless make
audits of executive discretion distinctive compared to most of what legislatures, courts,
and audit bureaucracies currently undertake. (1) Legislators train their attention on what
catches their attention, not on a random sample of discretionary decisions. Decisions that
are not reviewed randomly provide a biased sample, which can skew the reported results
either because of inherent characteristics in the sample or because the players being
“audited” strategically distort what they’re doing in the decisions more likely to be
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audited. Cases that are not reviewed at all don’t become the subject of any legislative,
political, or public pressure. We don’t learn anything if we don’t review something
relevant to the discretionary decisions made constantly throughout the government. (2)
Even when legislators and their staff choose to focus on something, their oversight does
not necessarily imply review of specific decisions. As with the audit bureaucracies,
oversight hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency’s policy priorities or
its handling of obvious crises. While staff may occasionally review random samples of
case files, this is not a routine component of legislative hearings. From a prescriptive
point of view, the results may provide less explicit – and instead more ambiguous –
findings, which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether government is
performing effectively.
IV.
AUDITS FACE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poor job of overseeing targeted executive
discretion, because the standard of deference is often set too high to give a meaningful
chance of discovering problems. Audits could tell us more, at a reasonable cost. But
they rarely happen. Why?
A. Observers Sometimes Fail to Distinguish Between Targeted Discretion and Policy
Judgments
I began this article by distinguishing among different kinds of discretion. Some
of government’s work is about writing executive orders to determine when covert
operations are warranted, designing regulatory rules for disposing of nuclear waste, or
similar tasks that involve broad policy judgments. Other decisions involve discrete
choices to impose costs (or deliver benefits) primarily on specific individuals and groups,
generally in accordance with some implicit standard or broad policy goal. Most of my
argument is about how to improve our ability to learn how bureaucratic institutions use
the second kind of flexibility, targeted discretion, to shape our welfare and security.
Although I have already acknowledged and discussed some overlap between such
targeted discretion and policy judgments, they are really quite different. Policy
judgments are about interpreting statutes, ambiguous facts, or policy considerations that
apply across an entire class of cases. Targeted discretion involves a discrete choice that
allocates burdens or benefits primarily onto an individual or group. Judgments of the
former kind lie at the core of regulatory rulemaking, on the other hand, are not. The latter
kind of discretion is instead primarily about applying legal rules, implicit standards, or
policy judgments onto specific cases. Indeed, even when targeted decisions seem
entangled with broad policy judgments, we can draw distinctions and make the former
kind of decision subject to a different sort of review (one that might even take as its
standard the policy judgment itself). Because courts and some commentators fail to fully
distinguish between these two kinds of decisions, it’s often unclear just why audits would
be appropriate. This also blurs the distinction between formal audits and the many auditlike political mechanisms that review the actions of government bureaucracies, like
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Inspector General reports on broad program characteristics and objectives, as well as
congressional fire-alarm type investigations.131
Lumping together these two kinds of discretion has the unfortunate effect of
making it seem harder to design an effective means of reviewing executive discretion.
From a court’s perspective, deference probably seems more attractive if discretion seems
to be about policy, because courts are so often assumed to lack the accountability and
expertise to make broad policy judgments across large numbers of cases. Earlier I
suggested that it might be possible to audit policy judgments such as those underlying
regulatory rules, but doing so would almost certainly require different procedures. This
has not stopped lawyers, judges, and scholars from often discussing discretion as if it
were one thing. And courts make deference decisions that draw no distinction between
supporting cases cited that concern targeted discretion, and those concerning broader
policy judgments.
B. Political Actors Have Polarizing Incentives
A second likely reason why audits of targeted discretion have so rarely
materialized thus far has to do with the incentives shaping the behavior of two important
sets of players who have stakes in the work of the executive branch. Officials in the
executive branch (and their allies in the legislature) obviously matter because they could
institute an audit system internally. They could support its implementation by the GAO
and IG offices. Or they could advocate for it in the legislature. The other set of players
involves those legislators (and their allies among organized interest groups) who are
generally opposed to expansive power in the executive branch.132 The problem, in a
nutshell, is this: Executive authorities and their allies will tend to want more discretion,
and less review. Unless they have a good reason for trying to cut down on their
flexibility in order to send a costly signal of some kind to overcome a commitment
problem,133 these players would probably prefer to avoid the embarrassment of an audit
that does not show them succeeding, and to retain the benefits of the flexibility implied
by that discretion. On the other hand, those who advocate against executive power may
gain something from keeping the debate polarized, which allows them to retain an issue
that can galvanize supporters. And depending on the situation, some such advocates
might prefer to hold out for winning more stringent review across the board instead of
settling for a compromise.
Executive branch officials would be loath to part with discretion, for at least two
reasons. First, discretion helps executive branch authorities carry out the functions that
they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the country, prevailing in
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military operations abroad, or (at least some of the time) keeping industrial workplaces
safe. Discretion is also valuable because it helps create certain impressions among
superiors, legislators on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.
People respond to what they can see. Targeted discretion lets government officials (or
their subordinates) choose what seems to be happening in a given area of the law. It
stands to reason that losing some of this power is not a welcome prospect. Neither is it
desirable to face the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come with
more stringent audits. One might expect supporters of executive power in the legislature
to take a similar position.134
What about legislators and interest groups concerned about limiting executive
power? Think first of the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is
doing. Political scientists have had a great deal to say about how legislators oversee the
bureaucracy. A now-classic strand of literature distinguishes between “fire-alarm”
oversight prompted by some interest group complaint or dramatic visible failure in the
executive branch, and “police patrol” methods that involve steady monitoring of the
bureaucracy week after week.135 Police patrol methods seem to encompass audits. But
as the literature persuasively establishes, legislators don’t always want to use that tactic
because it is costly. Even assuming that the conditions are present to make these
legislators want to use police patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group
to complain, it’s not obvious that the critics of executive power would want to press for
rigorous audits instead of simply polarizing the debate or attempting to embarrass their
political opponents.136 A highly polarized debate has some benefits. It may galvanize
support among certain constituencies. And legislators (along with their allies in external
interest groups) may prefer to win across the board than to support solutions that no
doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations outside
government. If the issue is the treatment of enemy combatants, for example, Human
Rights Watch may strongly prefer a system where authorities implement the Hamdi
decision in a way that drastically cuts down on executive discretion. Audits may seem
like a poor alternative by comparison. The choice between promoting audits (as a
compromise) or pressing for a more stringent standard of deference across the board thus
depends, as before, at least in part on the players’ subjective probabilities.
Considerably more could be said about the consequences of polarization for
issues of legal and bureaucratic structure. The main point, for now, is that polarization
probably diminishes the extent of political interest in review mechanisms that may be
socially optimal. When players have more polarized views about executive branch
power, substantive policy and law, or both, they probably have less to gain from
investing in audits or similar approaches.
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Of course, audits may in fact embarrass the executive branch. That depends on what the opponents
think the audits will reveal. But whatever political benefits audits can provide must be weighed against the
opportunity costs that I discuss above.
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C. Institutional Inertia Locks In Existing Conceptions of Adjudication
Lawyers constantly think of themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of
individual clients. Practicing lawyers join scholarly commentators in thinking of courts
as direct protectors of the rights of similarly-situated individuals. These frames are in
some tension with the idea of reviewing fewer cases in exchange for reviewing them
more thoroughly. Adjudication is often perceived as embodying at least two important
characteristics. First, if adjudication is going to be available, it is assumed to be a
recourse that should be available to all similarly-situated parties. People who have been
allegedly treated the same should not have different opportunities to vindicate their
claims. Circuit splits are a fact of life, but academic lawyers consider them problematic
precisely because they create distinctions in how similarly situated litigants would be
treated. Second, adjudication is supposed to provide a remedy. Which is why judgments
that don’t provide a remedy strike some observers as ridiculous, and why some scholars
have persuasively shown how it makes little sense to think about adjudication
constitutional rights without “equilibrating” that adjudicatory process with the remedies
in question.137
As I’ve defined them, audits don’t really conform to these assumptions. In a
narrow sense, they randomly privilege some people and not others. They don’t provide
an obvious remedy (though it’s certainly possible to fashion one). They seem, as a result,
to be ill-fitting proxies for a persistent set of concerns that help justify less deferential
adjudication. N doubt it’s true that constitutional provisions and values may require
adjudication. Sometimes deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes
in adjudication. But it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception of adjudication
could unduly dampen interest in audits. It promotes the false sense that the value of
audits are primarily seen where an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and
corrected. Instead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how it
works. This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but perhaps it sometimes
gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about protecting individual rights. Courts inclined
to serve as a counterweight can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or
substantial evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their decisions,
or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and Inspector General offices
recently. Although Vermont Yankee and similar cases preclude the full range of judicial
elaboration of new procedures, it does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest
that courts attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the extent to which a
specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.138
D. Narrow Conceptions of Auditor Mission Prevail
Which brings us back to how the audit bureaucracies behave. Like all
bureaucracies, the GAO and IG Offices are also affected by prevailing conceptions of
what it means for them to do carry out their work. Government employees who have
some flexibility to choose what to do and how to do it tend to make choices reflecting –
at least in part – their own sense of the mission they are supposed to carry out. Those
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choices can reinforce external perceptions, which in turn affect the work referred to the
agency, the financial resources it receives, the people who apply for jobs there, and the
standards used to evaluate whether the agency is succeeding in its work. Together these
factors then combine with the more prosaic political pressures both within and outside the
agency to shape its work environment.
The GAO and IG offices were created to serve as auditors. So at least one factor
shaping the priorities of these bureaucracies would be how the role of an auditor is
defined. As far as the legislators who created these bureaucracies are concerned, the
reference to auditing seems to be taken primarily as a reference to detecting financial
mismanagement or malfeasance. In the late 1970s, a GAO report commented on
legislative plans to create IG offices, and emphasized the urgent importance of auditing
the finances of government agencies. A scholarly commentator notes how this report
emphasized the tenor of the congressional discussion at the time:
Surveying every unit of the federal government, from whole agencies to small
program offices, GAO found that almost a third had not had a financial audit
since 1974. In unusually dramatic prose on the front cover, the report announced:
“One undred and thirty-three unites, with annual funding in excess of $20 billion,
told GAO they had not received a financial audit during fiscal years 1974 through
1976.139
The focus on financial waste and related themes should hardly be surprising, given the
potential political payoffs of creating bureaucracies that are designed to get rid of “waste,
fraud, and abuse.”140 It’s not easy to find legislators or executive branch officials in favor
of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse – though (particularly for the GAO) it’s certainly
plausible to think that the content and aggressiveness of investigations targeting such
problems would change depending on the partisan composition of the legislature and
executive branch.141 It’s also true that legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to
generate publicity and promote certain policy objectives.142 Nonetheless, to the extent
that legislators expect these bureaucracies to audit, it seems that they primarily expect
those audits to focus primarily on money and resources: who spent what funds, why
government vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees were asked to work
on some questionable task. This is despite the wide jurisdictional latitude that the law
gives both sets of agencies. There is no doubt that such latitude would allow them to
effectively audit the quality of the targeted discretionary decisions, but doing so seems
somewhat in tension with what legislators think of when someone says “GAO” or “IG.”
The same may be largely true of many managers and officials within the agencies
themselves. Those officials obviously retain some discretion to make choices about what
to audit (and what methodology to use) after all the external politics are taken into
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account. But too, it seems plausible that these agencies were locked in to a financial
auditing mission. Many (though certainly not all) Inspectors General have a background
in financial management or accounting. So does the Comptroller General, who heads the
GAO. Combine this with the fact that both supporters and detractors of greater executive
power have little incentive to push for audits of targeted discretion, and it starts to look
like the audit bureaucracies would only focus on targeted discretion sporadically and
idiosyncratically. And that’s exactly what they seem to do.
CONCLUSION
Executive branch lawyers recursively emphasize how dangerous and complicated
the world is when they argue before a court or submit a legal brief. So do the lawmakers
who sell the President’s program in the legislature. Both urge their audience to accept
danger and complexity as the hallmarks of a world demanding more discretion and less
doctrine. Harder to find among their verbal onslaught is any reference to two indelible
facts. The first is that executive discretion always carries risks as well as rewards. There
is nary a chance for sound governance, or any kind of governance, without discretion. Its
existence lets government protect the environment, prosecute serial rapists, keep workers
safe at industrial sites, and fight battles to protect its citizens. But history writes a
damning indictment of discretion’s abuse. It describes not only how Nixon’s IRS
embarrassed his enemies, or how Hoover’s FBI libelously fed speculation that slain civil
rights workers were promiscuous, mentally-ill subversives, but also how even the most
determined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their mistakes when they
don’t know they have committed them. None of this should be surprising given what we
know about organizations, the people who run them, and the complicated legal mandates
entrusted to them. The second fact is how much discretion the executive and its millions
of workers already have.
This article considered the implications of these two facts in light of two other
realities. Judicial review predictably and systematically fails to constrain the kind of
executive discretion that most directly affects people and organizations (what I call
targeted discretion). And we do next to nothing to audit how that discretion is used,
despite the presence of at least three different compelling reasons to think that executive
branch officials will have a relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion. (1)
Because some discretionary actions can signal competence and resolve to naïve observers
among the mass public, executive officials may have an incentive use their discretion to
create favorable impressions. (2) Some officials or their employees may be far less
subtle and engage in willful misconduct that is unlikely to be detected. (3) And
organizations may have a harder time learning without external mechanisms to
systematically review and critique their work.
It would be a mistake to reject the impact of traditional judicial review on many
forms of executive discretion. But it would be equally misguided to assume that courts
succeed in striking a reasonable balance between targeted discretion’s benefits and its
many costs. Instead courts make limited forays into the territory of executive power
when they hear cases about targeted discretion. The more costly the courts or legislature
assume those forays to be, the more deferential the review of targeted discretion.
Whatever the merits of this approach, it creates a situation where existing methods of
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court review can serve up the worst of both worlds: no meaningful probability of
uncovering problems in discretionary decisions, coupled with a prevailing sense that
courts can still remain the nation’s conscience and protect us from discretion’s darker
side.
Many who have raised these concerns have done so by taking part in a familiar
debate about the value of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this
article does not dismiss the value of that greater scrutiny, it offers an alternative to the
polarized rhetoric of that debate. It effectively says: even if one accepts that more
stringent judicial review is impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct
result is to let the executive branch’s wheels keep on spinning as they always have. The
key to that alternative is to think about the problem of policing executive discretion as an
information problem. The value of this approach lies in its potential to help sever the
connection between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion (both in terms of
direct review costs and in terms of interference with the valuable characteristics of
discretion) and the stringency of review. This property makes audits a promising
conceptual alternative to judicial review in those instances where it would be preferable
to study a subset of cases more carefully instead of superficially reviewing all of them.
Government powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may rightly seem less
threatening if their use can be effectively monitored through audits or similar procedures.
It may seem at first as though audits would only work if we lived in a world
perfect enough to make them unnecessary in the first place. But the institutional design
problems associated with auditing executive discretion call for an altogether subtler
diagnosis. Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing embrace of judicial
review, and the concomitant absence of activity auditing targeted discretion. When
lawyers and policymakers erase the distinction between targeted discretion and broader
policy judgments, they unduly restrict the scope of options available to help balance
discretion’s benefits and costs. Which is just fine for presidential administrations,
executive officials, and legislators supporting executive power: They’re perfectly happy
to let that power evade more frequent review. Somewhat counter-intuitively, advocates
of restraining that power may also have incentives to oppose audit-like approaches as a
matter of political strategy, because it lets them sound the alarm to their supporters while
they fight for more aggressive review across the board. That fight happens in a context
permeated by persistent (yet ultimately misleading) norms about the appropriate
relationship between adjudication and review of executive discretion, and similarly
durable conceptions of what existing auditors should do when they supervise government
agencies. Weakening these dynamics may require propitious circumstances and
Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the “perfect world” that would let us dispense with
audits (or, indeed, judicial review) altogether.
All of this tells a larger story that is not just about audits, but about the forces
affecting what we consider to be plausible conceptual alternatives to judicial review when
we address discretion-related problems. Judicial review gives judges, lawyers, and
legislators considerable room to innovate and experiment with different kinds of review
mechanisms. On the other hand, traditional court review does some things better than
others, and in some domains it does little or nothing at all. Yet we cling to it as the
premier method, other than perhaps the ill-defined political process itself, for providing
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some kind of constraint on executive discretion. We can easily spend another ten
months, or ten years, with the palliative machinery of the status quo grinding on. So
what? Surely it is naïve to assume reflexively that each unchecked discretionary decision
amounts to a disaster. What borders on madness is to think those decisions will turn out
just fine when existing law lets them so easily escape scrutiny. Perhaps it will take
decades to know the full costs of the inevitable mistakes and manipulation that get swept
under the rug when we freeze the wrong charity’s assets or inspect the wrong containers.
Then again, we may not be so lucky.
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Figure 1: Discretion and Traditional Judicial Review
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Figure 2: Comparing Audits to Traditional Judicial Review
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Figure 3: Why Judicial Review Fails
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Figure 4: Methodology Used in a Stratified Random Sample of GAO and IG Office
Reports, January 2002 – January 2005
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Figure 5: New York Times Reports on Audit Bureaucracies, January 2002-January 2005
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